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A B S T R A C T
We study whether independent-school competition involves a trade-oﬀ between pupil wellbeing and academic
performance. To test this hypothesis, we analyse data covering pupils across the OECD, exploiting historical
Catholic opposition to state schooling for exogenous variation in independent-school enrolment shares. We ﬁnd
that independent-school competition decreases pupil wellbeing but raises achievement and lowers educational
costs. Our analysis and balancing tests indicate these ﬁndings are causal. In addition, we ﬁnd several me-
chanisms behind the trade-oﬀ, including more traditional teaching and stronger parental achievement pressure.
1. Introduction
The extent to which independently-operated schools improve pupil
outcomes has become a ﬁercely debated topic in the economics of
education. An important motive behind reforms designed to increase
access to independent schools, such as vouchers, is that such schools
will increase competition and thus generate improvements in pupil
performance at the system level (e.g. Friedman, 1962; Le Grand, 2007;
Neal, 2002). In the past decades, research has begun to evaluate whe-
ther or not this holds true in diﬀerent contexts.
However, the existing literature focuses mostly on academic out-
comes. Certainly, such outcomes are important given their links with
labour-market success, non-pecuniary long-term outcomes, and eco-
nomic development (e.g. Atherton, Appleton, & Bleaney, 2013;
Brunello, Fort, Schneeweis, & Winter-Ebmer, 2016; Card, 1999;
Hanushek & Woessmann, 2012, 2016; Hanushek, Schwerdt,
Wiederhold, & Woessmann, 2015; Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2011). But
there are also important non-cognitive outputs of schooling. These
outputs include pupil wellbeing, which has become an increasingly
emphasised policy goal in western countries, justiﬁed by the fact that
wellbeing in childhood and adolescence is an important predictor of
risky behaviour, adult wellbeing, and a range of other outcomes (e.g.
Carneiro, Crawford, & Goodman, 2007; Frijters, Johnston, & Shields,
2014; Jones, 2013; Layard, Clark, Cornaglia, Powdthavee, & Vernoit,
2014; Lévy-Garboua, Lohéac, & Fayolle, 2006; Takakura, Wake, &
Kobayashi, 2010). As school is a key part of youngsters’ lives, it is
perhaps unsurprising that measures of wellbeing at school also predict a
range of more general wellbeing and behavioural indicators (e.g.
Gibbons & Silva, 2011; Huebner & Diener, 2008; Huebner & Gilman,
2006; Huebner et al., 2014; Locke & Newcomb, 2004). Furthermore, it
may be easier to positively aﬀect pupil wellbeing and other non-cog-
nitive indicators at school, compared with cognitive performance (e.g.
Heckman & Kautz, 2013; Payton et al., 2008).
Importantly, however, it is not clear that interventions improving
academic eﬃciency, in terms of academic output per dollar spent, also
have positive eﬀects on wellbeing at school. Progressive pedagogical
theory, characterised by child-centred ways of working, generally as-
sumes the two go hand in hand (Christodoulou, 2014; Mintz, 2012), an
idea that is often highlighted in policy debates. For example,
Public Health England (2014, p. 4) argues: ‘[P]romoting the health and
wellbeing of pupils and students within schools and colleges has the
potential to improve their educational outcomes and their health and
wellbeing outcomes’. Yet there is little rigorous empirical evidence
supporting this assumption. In fact, research suggests that policies im-
proving academic performance also often appear to make learning and
school life less joyful (e.g. Falch & Rønning, 2012; Jürges & Schneider,
2010; Warton, 2001). If this is the case, policies that raise academic
eﬃciency may also produce lower pupil wellbeing – thus generating a
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wellbeing-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ in education. We hypothesise that market
incentives, which are likely to induce stronger focus on academic eﬃ-
ciency, involve such a trade-oﬀ. Given the widespread belief in peda-
gogical and policy circles that wellbeing and academic achievement are
positively, and causally, related – as well as the considerable interest
paid to the eﬀects of market reforms in education in general – this is an
important issue to investigate in its own right.
Utilising pupil-level data from the Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA) covering 15-year old pupils across 34 OECD
countries, we test our hypothesis by analysing the system-level eﬀects
of independent-school competition on pupil wellbeing and academic
eﬃciency.1 We build on prior research – the most relevant of which is
West and Woessmann's (2010) – and use an instrumental-variable (IV)
strategy exploiting Catholic resistance to state schooling in the 19th and
early 20th centuries to predict enrolment shares in independently-op-
erated schools today. As school secularisation gained ground, Catholics
tended to push for access to independent schools in countries without
Catholicism as state religion. We thus use Catholic population shares in
1900, interacted with an indicator for whether or not Catholicism was
the state religion, as instrument for contemporary independent-school
enrolment shares. Controlling for detailed regional-ﬁxed eﬀects and a
number of relevant pupil-, school-, and country-level controls, in-
cluding the contemporary version of the instrument itself, it is plausible
that this variation is exogenous. This is especially true since we account
for a number of other important historical factors aﬀecting the extent to
which Catholic resistance did in fact generate higher independent-
school competition, and, if it did, the extent to which this competition
has survived to this day. If anything, other research and our analysis
suggest the strategy may bias the results against our hypothesis.
We ﬁnd that independent-school competition has considerable ne-
gative eﬀects on pupil wellbeing. The eﬀects are just as conspicuous
when restricting the sample to pupils in state schools, indicating that
the impact depends on system-level competition rather than on the
direct impact of independent-school attendance and/or pupil sorting.
We further conﬁrm positive eﬀects of competition on PISA scores and a
negative impact on education expenditures found in previous research
(see West & Woessmann, 2010), thus supporting the idea of a well-
being-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. Balancing tests on pupil-background vari-
ables support the causal interpretation of our ﬁndings.
Analysing potential mechanisms behind the trade-oﬀ, we ﬁnd that
competition induces more traditional teaching, instructional time, and
homework, which prior research suggests raise achievement and lower
wellbeing. Also, competition makes pupil-teacher relations more hier-
archical and increases parental achievement pressure, two other re-
levant mechanisms behind the wellbeing-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.
Finally, based on our ﬁndings and other research comparing the
longer-term returns to cognitive achievement and wellbeing in ado-
lescence, we carry out a basic back-of-the-envelope cost-beneﬁt ana-
lysis. This indicates that the positive eﬀects of independent-school
competition on academic eﬃciency outweigh the negative impact on
pupil wellbeing from an economic standpoint. However, using adult life
satisfaction as the unit of measurement rather than money, the costs of
competition appear to outweigh its beneﬁts. While further research is
necessary to draw strong conclusions in this respect, the analysis at
least suggests a more general trade-oﬀ between the traditional goals of
education policy and the wellbeing agenda to which policymakers
should pay attention.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
link between school competition and wellbeing as well as related re-
search; Section 3 outlines the data analysed in detail; Section 4 de-
scribes the methodology; Section 5 presents the results and a tentative
back-of-the-envelope cost-beneﬁt analysis; and Section 6 concludes.
2. Theory and related literature
Theoretically, the system-level eﬀects of independently-operated
schools should depend on parental demand for diﬀerent outcomes. If
parents perceive the marginal utility of wellbeing at school to be high,
we might expect independent-school competition to have positive ef-
fects in this respect. For example, increasing access to independent
schools expands school choice, which may allow for a better match
between pupil and school (e.g. Adnett & Davies, 2002). Additionally,
independent schools may be more responsive to pupil needs and have
more capacity to innovate (e.g. Chubb & Moe, 1988). Finally, with more
opportunities for choice, schools must compete to attract pupils (e.g.
Hoxby, 2003). The competitive pressures, in turn, would force schools
that produce low wellbeing to either improve or go out of business.
Overall, the result would be higher pupil wellbeing on average
throughout the system.
However, this story hinges on the assumption that parents value
pupil wellbeing, and, if there are trade–oﬀs between wellbeing and
other types of school quality, that they value the former more than the
latter. The research in this respect is admittedly scarce, but it does not
support this assumption. In England, Gibbons and Silva (2011) ﬁnd that
peer quality and school value added dominate pupil wellbeing as pre-
dictors of parental satisfaction with schools. And whereas peer quality
and school value added are capitalised into house prices, average pupil
happiness is not. This indicates that parents prefer academic and peer
quality over pupil wellbeing, thus generating stronger incentives for
schools to focus on the former rather than the latter.
Certainly, progressive pedagogical theory, characterised by child-
centred ways of working, highlights the importance of wellbeing for
improving achievement (Christodoulou, 2014; Mintz, 2012). Yet there
is little evidence in favour of this hypothesis. On the contrary, cognitive
research suggests that memorisation, repetition, and teaching of facts –
activities that are not necessarily fun or inspiring – are key to learning
(Christodoulou, 2014; Ingvar & Eldh, 2014). Furthermore, research has
found that educational methods and interventions promoting higher
performance, including traditional teaching methods and central exit
examinations, also often appear to make learning and school life less
joyful (e.g. Algan, Cahuc, & Shleifer, 2013; Bietenback, 2014; Jiang &
McComas, 2015; Jürges & Schneider, 2010; Jürges, Schneider,
Senkbeil, & Carstensen, 2012; Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Regh,
2012; Schwerdt & Wuppermann, 2011; Sweller, Kirschner, & Clark,
2007). Similar stories apply to time spent in school, instructional time,
and time spent doing homework (Aucejo & Romano, 2014;
Csikszentmihalyi & Hunter, 2003; Falch & Rønning, 2012; Gustafsson,
2013; Kuehn & Landeras, 2012; Lavy, 2015; Rivkin & Schiman, 2015;
Warton, 2001). In other words, in contrast to the assumptions of pro-
gressive pedagogical theory, practices that produce higher academic
eﬃciency also often seem to generate lower pupil wellbeing.2
A potential reason explaining these results is that interventions with
positive eﬀects on achievement make pupils work harder, which may in
turn increase their stress levels and thus decrease their wellbeing.
Another possibility is that the interventions decrease wellbeing via
raised stress levels that induce pupils to focus more on their schoolwork
– which, in turn, raise achievement. Yet another possible reason is that
achievement and wellbeing aﬀect each other positively, but that the net
eﬀect of the interventions on wellbeing is still negative due to other
mechanisms that operate independently of achievement. Regardless of
the mechanism, the cause of the diﬀerential eﬀects is in any case the
1 For a discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of using international data,
see Hanushek and Woessmann (2011).
2 In an interesting contribution less related to wellbeing, West et al. (2016) ﬁnd that
Boston charter schools that produce high cognitive achievement appear to have negative
eﬀects on various self-reported non-cognitive measures. However, the latter impact may
be due to reference bias, since charter-school pupils report having considerably stricter
and more hierarchical school environments characterised by high expectations. By
studying competition at the country level, we minimise the potential for similar reference
bias in pupil wellbeing.
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interventions per se – which appear to involve a causal net trade-oﬀ
between achievement and wellbeing.
However, whether or not such a trade-oﬀ applies to market in-
centives in education is an open question. The literature analysing the
eﬀects of school choice, autonomy, and competition is mixed, but often
ﬁnds small-to-moderate positive eﬀects on academic outcomes and
overall eﬃciency (e.g. Böhlmark & Lindahl, 2015; Chakrabarti, 2008;
Eyles & Machin, 2015; Lavy, 2010; Muralidharan & Sundararaman,
2015).3 For this paper's purposes, the most relevant research is
West and Woessmann's (2010) study, which uses similar data and in-
strument as we do. They ﬁnd that larger independent-school enrolment
shares improve academic eﬃciency by raising performance in PISA and
lowering per-pupil expenditures.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, only one paper analyses
eﬀects on pupil wellbeing. Utilising Spanish high-school data, with an
identiﬁcation strategy based on independent-school availability,
Green, Navarro-Paniagua, Ximénez-de-Embún, and Mancebón (2014)
ﬁnd negative eﬀects on pupil satisfaction of attending independently-
operated schools. The authors speculate that this negative impact may
be due to a stronger focus on academic achievement in such schools.
However, they do not empirically investigate potential trade-oﬀs di-
rectly or study the system-level eﬀects of independent-school compe-
tition.
Overall, therefore, while the theoretical impact of competition from
independently-operated schools on pupil wellbeing is somewhat am-
biguous, it appears more reasonable to predict a negative eﬀect.
However, it also appears reasonable to predict that this negative impact
will be accompanied by a positive eﬀect on academic eﬃciency. We
therefore expect a trade-oﬀ in terms of how school competition aﬀects
pupil wellbeing and academic eﬃciency. The next section describes the
data utilised to investigate these issues.
3. Data
To study how independent-school competition aﬀects pupil well-
being and academic eﬃciency, as well as mechanisms behind a po-
tential trade-oﬀ, we exploit pupil-level data from the 2012 round of the
OECD's PISA survey. PISA was created as a reliable metric of pupil
knowledge, and has been carried out every three years since 2000. In
the 2012 round, representative samples of pupils aged between 15 years
and three months and 16 years and two months in 34 OECD countries –
as well as in 31 other partner countries or economies – were tested in
mathematical, reading, and scientiﬁc literacy.
In addition to sitting the tests, pupils complete questionnaires with
rich details on their background characteristics and personal views,
which we use to obtain indicators for pupil wellbeing. While the total
sample across the 34 OECD countries covers about 295,000 pupils, the
rotating design of the questionnaire means that the sample size when
analysing wellbeing is about 190,000 pupils.4 To obtain information on
ownership structure and funding sources, we also make use of the
school-level questionnaire, which enquired headteachers about school-
background information. Table A1 outlines the descriptive statistics of
the variables used in the analysis.
3.1. Pupil wellbeing
In PISA 2012, pupils were for the ﬁrst time asked about their hap-
piness at school, or more speciﬁcally to what extent they agree with the
following statement: ‘I feel happy at school’. Pupils were asked to
choose one of the following options: (1) ‘strongly agree’, (2) ‘agree’, (3),
‘disagree’, or (4) ‘strongly disagree’, which we recode so that higher
values indicate higher wellbeing. Research indicates that similar mea-
sures of subjective wellbeing are valid and reliable, both across and
within countries, for children and adults alike (e.g. Alesina, Tella, &
MacCulloch, 2004; Frey & Stutzer, 2002; Gilman & Huebner, 2003;
Huebner, 2004; Krueger & Schkade, 2008; Veenhoven, 2012). While
our preferred measure may to some extent also pick up general well-
being, this is not necessarily a problem. This is because happiness at
school is likely to aﬀect wellbeing more generally. Indeed, previous
research suggests similar measures predict general wellbeing indicators,
such as depression, anxiety, life satisfaction, and suicidal ideation
(Gibbons & Silva, 2011; Huebner & Diener, 2008; Huebner & Gilman,
2006; Huebner et al., 2014; Locke & Newcomb, 2004). For our pur-
poses, it makes most conceptual sense to study wellbeing at school
speciﬁcally since the independent variable of interest is likely to aﬀect
wellbeing primarily via the school environment, and because we are
particularly interested in the potential trade-oﬀ between pupil well-
being and academic achievement. By focusing on wellbeing at school
speciﬁcally, we therefore study the parameter of wellbeing that is most
relevant to education policy per se. As highlighted by the OECD (2013,
p. 33): ‘As schools are a, if not the, primary social environment for 15-
year olds, these subjective evaluations [of pupil happiness] provide a
good indication of whether education systems are able to foster or
hinder overall student well-being.’ We thus believe our principal well-
being measure is highly relevant for the purpose of this paper. Never-
theless, in robustness tests, we also consider alternative wellbeing
metrics that are less likely to pick up pupils’ attitudes to the school
itself, including peer relations.
3.2. Academic eﬃciency
While our principal focus is on pupil wellbeing, we also analyse
PISA scores in all subjects as well as cumulative per-pupil expenditures
between ages 6 and 15, which we obtain from the OECD (2016a).5 This
allows us to investigate whether or not the positive eﬀects on academic
achievement and negative impact on educational expenditures, found
in previous research using a similar methodology (West &
Woessmann, 2010), are detected also in our extended sample of coun-
tries in PISA 2012 and with the methodological alterations described in
Section 4.1 and Appendix B. This is important for ensuring that our
interpretation of a potential trade-oﬀ is correct.
3.3. Potential mechanisms
In addition, we consider potential mechanisms through which in-
dependent-school competition may operate. One plausible mechanism
could be the way teachers interact with children and speciﬁcally their
teaching methods. As noted in Section 2, research ﬁnds that pupil-
centred methods generate lower achievement, while at the same time
making learning more enjoyable. If competition sharpens incentives to
raise academic eﬃciency, teachers may thus use more traditional
methods as a means to compete. To study this issue, we use pupils’
views regarding the extent to which their mathematics teachers are
student oriented, according to the OECD's (2014) taxonomy: ‘The tea-
cher gives diﬀerent work to classmates who have diﬃculties learning
and/or to those who can advance faster’; ‘The teacher assigns projects
that require at least one week to complete’; ‘The teacher has us work in
small groups to come up with a joint solution to a problem or task’; and
‘The teacher asks us to help plan classroom activities or topics’. Pupils
3 See Heller-Sahlgren (2013) for a comprehensive review and assessment of this lit-
erature.
4 In PISA 2012, the questionnaire was divided into one common part, which covers
background variables and was administered to all pupils, and one rotating part, which
includes additional question sets that were randomly allocated to pupils within schools.
The design, which follows the one for the cognitive test itself, means that about two thirds
of pupils answered all questions in the rotating part (see OECD, 2014).
5 For this analysis, we use the expenditure data reported in the PISA 2009 report since
the data for Greece is missing in the PISA 2012 report. However, results are essentially
identical if we instead use the latter data and exclude Greece.
G. Heller-Sahlgren Economics of Education Review 62 (2018) 66–81
68
are asked to choose one of the following options: (1) ‘Every lesson’, (2)
‘Most lessons’, (3) ‘Some lessons’, or (4) ‘Never or hardly ever’. We
recode the responses so that higher values indicate more use of pupil-
centred methods.
Furthermore, we also consider a related potential mechanism:
hierarchical school environments. Research on Knowledge is Power
Program (KIPP) schools indicates that school models predicated on
hierarchical environments boost pupil performance (e.g.
Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, Hull, & Pathak, 2016; Angrist, Pathak, &
Walters, 2013). However, more hierarchical school environments may
lower pupil wellbeing via worsened pupil-teacher relations. To study
these issues, we use responses to the statement ‘Most of my teachers
really listen to what I have to say’ as a proxy for the degree of hierarchy
in pupils’ relationships with teachers, and responses to the statement
‘Students get along well with most teachers’ as a general measure of
pupil-teacher relations. In these cases, pupils were asked to choose one
of the following options: (1) ‘strongly agree’; (2) ‘agree’; (3) ‘disagree’;
or (4) ‘strongly disagree’, which we recode so that higher values in-
dicate less hierarchical and better pupil-teacher relations.
In addition, we investigate the eﬀects of competition on parental
achievement pressure. Such pressure could be positively related to
both competition and performance, while also having negative ef-
fects on wellbeing. Thus, we consider headteachers’ appraisals of the
level of parental pressure to achieve high academic achievement: (1)
‘There is constant pressure from many parents, who expect our
school to set very high academic standards and to have our students
achieve them; (2) ‘Pressure on the school to achieve higher academic
standards among students comes from a minority of parents’; or (3)
‘Pressure from parents on the school to achieve higher academic
standards among students is largely absent’. We recode the responses
so that higher values indicate stronger parental achievement pres-
sure.6
Finally, we analyse instructional time and time spent on homework.
As noted in Section 2, these variables have been found to be positive for
academic achievement, while also being associated with lower well-
being. We thus analyse pupil responses to the question: ‘In a normal,
full week at school, how many class periods do you have in total?’. We
further consider the number of class periods per week in each of the test
subjects.7 Unlike the previous statements, these are open questions and
pupils are thus asked to write down the total number of class periods
per week, instead of choosing from diﬀerent sets of options. To analyse
the total impact on time spent doing homework, we instead use the
number of hours per week pupils report that they spend on ‘Homework
or other study set by your teachers’. Again, this question is open rather
than closed.
3.4. Independent-school competition
In order to capture independent-school competition at the system
level, we use the proportion of 15-year old pupils who attend in-
dependently-operated schools in each country, calculated from the PISA
2012 school questionnaire. In this questionnaire, headteachers were
asked to report whether or not their school is a ‘private school’, deﬁned
as a school managed directly or indirectly by a non-government orga-
nisation, such as a church, trade union, business, or other private in-
stitution, or a ‘public school’, deﬁned as a school managed directly or
indirectly by a public education authority, government agency, or
governing board appointed by government or elected by public
franchise. The aggregate share of pupils attending independently-op-
erated schools is a useful measure to capture the level of independent-
school competition in an education system and has been used in similar
research (see Hanushek & Woessmann, 2011).
3.5. Control variables
We obtain relevant control variables from the school and pupil
questionnaires. First, we include controls for a range of pupil-back-
ground characteristics: gender, age, immigrant background (ﬁrst and
second generation), an index of home possessions, the highest occu-
pational status of parents, and the highest educational level of parents,
expressed in years of schooling.8 We also include indicators for whether
or not schools are located in a village, small town, town, city, or large
city.9 In addition, we control for pupils’ school starting age and grade
attended. Since sampling is based on pupils’ age at test, these variables
may reﬂect important institutional characteristics of diﬀerent education
systems, which could potentially correlate with both our outcome
variables and the instrument discussed in Section 4.1 through me-
chanisms other than competition.10
Finally, we also control for a number of country-level variables,
including (log) GDP per capita in 2011, obtained from the
OECD (2016b), and regional dummies for Oceania, East Asia, Europe,
Middle East, Latin America, and North America in the baseline esti-
mates. In most models, however, we further include dummies for
Anglo-Saxon Europe, Northern Europe, Western Continental Europe,
Eastern Europe, and Southern Europe. This allows us to control for
ﬁne-grained regional-ﬁxed eﬀects to ensure that cross-national cul-
tural diﬀerences associated with both the instrument discussed in
Section 4.1 and the outcomes are less likely to bias the ﬁndings.11 In
addition, we control for other relevant country-level variables dis-
cussed in Section 4 and Appendix B to strengthen our instrumental-
variable strategy.
4. Empirical set-up
To study the impact of independent-school competition on the
outcomes discussed in Section 3, our starting point is the following OLS
model:
= + + + + +o α β sp β x β y β z ɛpsc c psc sc c psc1 2 3 4 (1)
where opsc is the outcome of pupil p in school s in country c; spc denotes
6 Since the sampling procedure of schools was designed to optimise sampling of pupils
rather than schools, the OECD recommends that researchers ‘analyse school-level vari-
ables as attributes of students rather than as elements in their own right’ (OECD, 2014, p.
398). This means that we analyse the eﬀects of headteachers’ responses at the pupil level
rather than the school level.
7 Since class periods vary in length, we also analysed the average period length in each
of the test subjects in robustness tests. The results are brieﬂy discussed in footnote 31.
8 Foreign-born pupils with two foreign-born parents are classiﬁed as ﬁrst-generation
immigrants, whereas native-born pupils with at least one foreign-born parent and foreign-
born pupils with one native-born parent are classiﬁed as second-generation immigrants.
Thus, pupils with two native-born parents are classiﬁed as natives. The index of home
possessions, the highest occupational status of parents, and the highest years of schooling
of parents compose the broader ESCS index (see OECD, 2014).
9 The average socio-economic and ethnic background of school peers may also aﬀect
the outcomes. However, since independent-school competition may increase school seg-
regation (e.g. Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Böhlmark, Holmlund, and Lindahl, 2016), peer
background is a potential mechanism through which competition may aﬀect wellbeing as
well as academic eﬃciency and is thus a ‘bad control’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
However, as displayed in Table A5, the results are robust to controlling for the school-
level mean of all pupil-level variables.
10 As in most surveys, the PISA dataset contains some missing values for pupil- and
school-level variables, although this problem is minor for any single control in our ana-
lysis. Nevertheless, we impute values for missing control variables using the weighted
mean at the school or country level, always using the lowest level available. For dummy
variables, we assign a value of 1 or 0 depending on which category the mean is closest to.
In order to ensure that the results are not biased by this procedure, we also include
dummies for missing values and interactions between them and the imputed values.
Similar techniques are used widely in previous research analysing PISA data (see
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). Results are essentially identical if we instead drop
observations with any control containing missing values.
11 Note, however, that we refrain from controlling for input variables, such as edu-
cation spending and class size, which are ‘bad controls’ and should be left out of the
equation.
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the share of pupils attending independently-operated schools in each
country; xpsc is a vector of pupil-level predictors; ysc is a vector of
school-level predictors; and zc is a vector of country-level predictors.
The model's assumption is that Cov(spc, =x y zɛ , , ) 0psc psc sc c .
However, if xpsc, ysc, and zc together do not include all variables that
impact both opsc and spc, or if opsc aﬀects spc directly, it would mean that
Cov(spc, ɛpsc|xpsc, ysc, zc)≠ 0 and the results will suﬀer from endogeneity
bias (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). That is, the level of independent-school
competition may in itself be aﬀected by the outcomes, generating re-
verse causality, and/or omitted variables may aﬀect both the level of
independent-school competition and the outcomes. The direction of
bias arising from these issues is theoretically unclear, and partly de-
pends on relative parental demand for diﬀerent types of school quality
per the discussion in Section 2.
4.1. Obtaining exogenous variation in independent-school competition
To address potential endogeneity, we seek to obtain exogenous
variation in independent-school competition by exploiting historical
resistance to state schooling among Catholics. This strategy has pre-
viously been used to predict independent-school enrolment shares
within and between countries (Allen & Vignoles, 2015; Cohen-Zada,
2009; Cohen-Zada & Elder, 2009; Falck & Woessmann, 2013; West &
Woessmann, 2010). The idea is that in countries where Catholicism was
not the de facto state religion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
Catholics ﬁercely resisted the growing state monopolisation of educa-
tion.
This is because in countries where Catholics could not ensure that
teaching in state schools was consistent with their doctrine, such as
Belgium, they worked to establish independent schools and pushed
governments to obtain public funding for them. In some countries,
Catholics joined forces with other groups that sought access to in-
dependently-operated schools. For example, in the Netherlands,
Catholics teamed up with Calvinists against secular forces in the
Schoolstrijd, which only ended in 1917 when equal funding for in-
dependent and state schools was enshrined in the Dutch constitution. As
a general rule, however, Protestants were more accepting of state
monopolisation of education and rarely engaged in the same struggles.
Nevertheless, when Catholics were successful, the laws implemented
often supported funding for other independent schools as well (see
Glenn, 1989, 2011). We discuss the intuition, and historical features
that interfere with its logic, in more detail in Appendix B.
Thus, Catholic population shares in the early 20th century in
countries where Catholicism was not the de facto state religion should
be a useful instrument for enrolment shares in independently-operated
schools today, once controlling for other relevant predictors discussed
below. We obtain Catholic population shares in 1900 and 2010 from
Brown and James (2015) and indicators for whether or not Catholicism
was the state religion in 1900, 1970, and 2000 from Barrett, Kurian,
and Johnson (2001).12 Our instrument is then constructed from the
interaction between Catholic population shares in 1900 and a dummy
variable taking the value of 0 for countries in which Catholicism was
the de facto state religion in 1900 as well as immediately before World
War II and 1 otherwise.13 The latter restriction is applied because the
political dynamic in the education sphere in countries that permanently
disestablished the Catholic Church early in the 20th century was often
similar to those that had done so by 1900.14 This historical instrument
allows us to control directly for its contemporary version: Catholic
population shares in 2010 interacted with an indicator taking the value
of 0 if Catholicism was the state religion in 1900, 1970, and 2000, and 1
otherwise.15 This means that we control for any direct impact on the
dependent variable that our instrument may pick up, and that the
exogenous variation we exploit stems only from interactions in histor-
ical Catholic population shares and state religion that are unrelated to
the contemporary interaction between these variables – that is, the
change in the interaction – when holding constant the other variables in
the model.
Also, in addition to the controls discussed in Section 3.5, we take
further precautions by adjusting for the following variables: Calvinist
population shares in 1900; population size in 1900; Communist and
post-Soviet backgrounds; indicators for early defeat of the Catholic
Church in countries where Catholicism was not the state religion; na-
tional bans on Jesuits in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; in-
dicators for countries or regions that were de facto annexed into Nazi
Germany during World War II; indicators for pro-Catholic allies or
client states of Nazi Germany; and indicators for countries or regions
that recently implemented voucher programmes in which for-proﬁt
operators participate on an equal basis, or carried out reforms that
encouraged mass conversions of state schools to independently-oper-
ated status.
The general idea behind the inclusion of these variables is to control
for sources of current independent-school enrolment shares that cannot
be attributed to the instrument and thus maximise its relevance and
increase conﬁdence in its validity. To save space, we discuss the com-
plete rationales for each variable in Appendix B and only provide a few
short illustrations here. One example concerns Calvinists, who in some
countries joined the Catholics’ more general resistance to secular state
schooling, giving the latter a probability of success that was dis-
proportionate to the relative size of their community. We take this into
account by controlling for the share of Calvinists in 1900. Another
example is the role of the Society of Jesus in the establishment of in-
dependent schools, as the ﬁrst teaching order of the Catholic Church.
During the struggle between secular and religious forces in the 19th
century, Jesuits and their associate orders were often banned from
certain territories for longer periods of time, often speciﬁcally because
of their educational inﬂuence. We thus control for these bans in our set-
up. A third example relates to the impact of Nazi Germany during
World War II. Being part of, or de facto annexed into (but not occupied
by), the Greater German Reich meant severe persecution of the Catholic
Church and closure of all independent schools. We take this into ac-
count by controlling for an indicator of Nazi takeover and de facto
annexation. Again, detailed accounts of all additional adjustments are
provided in Appendix B.16
12 The only adjustments we make to the data obtained from Barrett et al. (2001) are:
(1) Ireland is treated as not having Catholicism as state religion in 1900, since it was then
part of the non-Catholic United Kingdom (see Barro and McCleary, 2005), and (2) Austria
is treated as having Catholicism as its de facto state religion in 1900. Although the region
that became Austria in 1918 did not oﬃcially have any state religion since the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the state provided an essential Catholic monopoly in the
public education system, also after the formation of the state in 1918 until Nazi Ger-
many's annexation of the country in 1938 (Glenn, 2011; Kaiser and Wohnout, 2004).
13 For Slovakia, we use Catholic population shares in 1910 since this is the ﬁrst year for
which data are available for the country in Brown and James's (2015) data series.
14 For example, while Chile only abolished Catholicism as state religion in 1925, the
public education system had become secularised and centralised already in the mid-to-
late 1800s, much to the denigration of the country's Catholics who consequently began
pushing for access to independent schools (Barr-Melej, 2001; Collier, 1997; Gauri, 1998).
As discussed in Appendix B, a similar story applies to France prior to the abrogation of
Napoleon's Concordat of 1801 in 1905.
15 The overall results are similar if we instead simply control for Catholic population
shares in 2010 in all countries, by itself or together with a separate indicator for whether
or not Catholicism was the de facto state religion in 1900, 1970, and 2000.
16 Without the inclusion of at least some of these variables, the F statistics drops ra-
dically, suggesting the instrument becomes too weak. For example, if we only include
broader-regional ﬁxed eﬀects together with the pupil-level and school-location controls,
the F statistic in the ﬁrst stage drops from about 46 to 3. Adding (log) GDP per capita and
the Communist indicator only increases the F statistics to 5, but adding indicators for
post-Soviet background and national Jesuit bans raises the F statistics to 22. Adding the
other variables then strengthens the instrument further. Excluding the additional controls
also makes the data less balanced. Speciﬁcally, the instrument then signiﬁcantly predicts
the index of home possessions, which is the best pupil-level predictor of pupil happiness
and a key predictor of test scores. Overall, the controls thus add considerable value by
increasing the relevance and validity of the instrument.
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4.2. IV speciﬁcation
Thus, to obtain plausibly exogenous variation in independent-school
enrolment shares across OECD countries, we then estimate the fol-
lowing 2SLS model:
= + + + + +sp α β cs β x β y β z1900 ɛc c psc sc c psc1 2 3 4 (2)
= + + + + +o α β sp β x β y β z ɛpsc c psc sc c psc1 2 3 4 (3)
where spc is the predicted values of spc from the ﬁrst stage, while
1900csc represents the excluded instrument, outlined in Section 4.1.
The vectors xpsc, ysc, and zc denote the pupil-, school-, and country-level
controls discussed in Sections 3.5 and 4.1, including 2010csc, which
denotes the contemporary version of the instrument. The variation in
the ﬁrst stage is thus driven by the interaction between historical
Catholic population shares and the state religion indicator when
holding constant the contemporary interaction between these variables
– thus obtaining identiﬁcation from the change in the interaction over
time – and only comparing countries within the regions controlled for
by the regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. We cluster the standard errors at the
country level, weight all regressions by pupils’ inverse sampling prob-
ability, and give each country equal aggregate weight in the regres-
sions.17
Of course, it is impossible to prove conclusively whether or not the
above model captures the eﬀects of competition on pupil wellbeing and
academic eﬃciency, rather than the instrument's eﬀects through a
diﬀerent channel. This may seem especially important since we study
several outcomes, which as discussed in Section 2 might aﬀect each
other, but the assumptions are the same. Indeed, if our strategy does
ensure bona ﬁde exogenous variation in school competition, the fun-
damental cause of the eﬀects on the separate outcomes is independent-
school competition rather than the instrument itself – irrespectively of
whether the outcome variables then aﬀect each other as a result of this
competition. The crucial aspect is thus to investigate, as far as possible,
whether the instrument aﬀects the outcome variables apart from via
school competition or any mechanism through which school competi-
tion operates. We explain how we seek to do so below.
4.3. Catholicism and wellbeing
The speciﬁcation above hinges on that historical Catholic popula-
tion shares are conditionally unrelated to contemporary pupil well-
being, in countries where Catholicism was not the state religion, apart
from via contemporary independent-school competition. We believe
this is a tenable assumption. If anything, the strategy may bias results
against supporting our hypothesis that competition decreases pupil
wellbeing. This is because research ﬁnds Catholic population shares to
have positive spill-over eﬀects on the wellbeing of Catholics and most
non-Catholics, including Protestants (Clark & Lelkes, 2009).18 It is thus
more likely that our research strategy would bias results in the opposite
direction compared with what our hypothesis predicts. We can also
indirectly test whether or not this is correct. If the assumption holds
true, the contemporary version of the instrument, which is controlled
for in Eq. (3), should be positively associated with pupil wellbeing. If
the contemporary version's relationship with pupil wellbeing is posi-
tive, the instrument is likely to be only negatively related to pupil
wellbeing via its impact on the level of independent-school competition
today, once we adjust for the control variables in the model.
4.4. Catholicism and academic eﬃciency
Our analysis of a wellbeing-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ hinges upon a causal
interpretation also of the eﬀects of independent-school competition on
academic eﬃciency. Again, the strategy is more likely to work against
ﬁnding evidence for our hypothesis. This is because Catholics histori-
cally emphasised cognitive achievement less compared with other
groups, as indicated by the direct negative correlation between Catholic
population shares and literacy rates in the early 20th century (see West
& Woessmann, 2010). This makes it likely that our estimates for aca-
demic outcomes will be negatively biased. Since the instrument's logic
partly hinges on that Catholics historically lobbied governments to in-
crease public funding for independent schools, our strategy is also more
likely to bias eﬀects upward in the analysis of per-pupil educational
expenditures (and thus against our hypothesis). Again, we can in-
directly test whether or not these intuitions are correct. If so, we expect
the contemporary version of our instrument, which is controlled for in
Eq. (3), to be negatively (positively) related to achievement (ex-
penditures) today. If this holds true, it suggests that our historical in-
strument is only positively (negatively) related to contemporary PISA
scores (expenditures) through independent-school competition. If any-
thing, the results should then be biased against ﬁnding evidence sup-
porting our hypothesis.
4.5. Balancing tests
Another way to explore whether or not the instrument is exogenous,
once controlling for the other relevant country- and school-level vari-
ables, is to carry out balancing tests on the pupil-background char-
acteristics that are included in the models analysing the eﬀects of in-
dependent-school competition on pupil wellbeing and academic
eﬃciency. We do so by swapping these indicators as dependent vari-
ables for each of the pupil-background variables included in the main
regressions, while simultaneously excluding all other pupil-level vari-
ables on the right-hand side of the equation.19 If the variation in in-
dependent-school competition predicted by the instrument is not sig-
niﬁcantly related to the pupil-background indicators, once adjusting for
the other country- and school-level variables included in the model, it
indicates that the instrument is indeed likely to be exogenous.
5. Results
5.1. Pupil happiness
As a starting point, Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 show the results
from the OLS model when analysing our measure of pupil wellbeing:
happiness at school. The estimates indicate that independent-school
competition is negatively associated with pupil happiness, regardless of
whether we control only for broader regional-ﬁxed eﬀects or also in-
clude controls for regions within Europe. Thus, there is a negative
correlation between competition and pupil wellbeing across OECD
countries.
17 When analysing PISA scores, we follow the OECD's (2014) recommendation and
account for the fact that scores are estimated from ﬁve separate ‘plausible values’, created
via an item response theory model.
18 This does not necessarily mean that Catholics have higher wellbeing than other
people. Controlling for a range of background characteristics, Clark and Lelkes (2009)
ﬁnd that Catholics have equally high wellbeing as Protestants, but that both Catholics and
Protestants have higher wellbeing than adherents of other religions and non-religious
people. Other research ﬁnds similar albeit slightly diﬀerent results (see Graham and
Crown, 2014). On the other hand, Becker and Woessmann (2015) ﬁnd that Protestants are
more likely to commit suicide than Catholics, which they argue is due to Catholics’
stronger levels of social cohesion. Regardless, for our purposes, the direct association
between religious aﬃliation and wellbeing is less important since our instrument is based
on historical Catholic population shares – which, if anything, appear to be positively
related to wellbeing.
19 Note that we do not use any imputed data in these analyses. In the models analysing
immigrant background, we also exclude pupils from the other immigrant category to
ensure that we compare each category with natives only.
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Turning to the IV model, the ﬁrst-stage results suggest our instru-
ment is strong, with the F statistics displaying values of about 46.
Meanwhile, the second stage displays that the coeﬃcient for in-
dependent-school competition increases in size compared with the OLS
estimates, indicating that the latter are biased downwards. Our pre-
ferred speciﬁcation, which includes within-European regional-ﬁxed
eﬀects, indicates that a 10 percentage-point increase in independent-
school enrolment shares lowers pupil happiness by 0.13 points on the
ordinal 1–4 scale, which corresponds to 0.17 standard deviations (SD).
The estimate is not very precise, but we can rule out an eﬀect size lower
than 0.09 SD. The reduced-form estimates in the lower-left panel fur-
ther support the results.
One potential reason why the OLS models underestimate the causal
impact of independent-school competition on pupil wellbeing may be
that competition emerges as a response to low test scores (see Hoxby,
1994; West & Woessmann, 2010). This, in turn, may be due to lower
focus on academic achievement and higher focus on wellbeing, as
suggested by the trade-oﬀ hypothesis discussed in Section 2 and ana-
lysed further in Section 5.4. If so, one would expect OLS estimates to
bias the eﬀects of competition toward zero both when analysing pupil
wellbeing and test scores, albeit from diﬀerent directions.
Thus, our analysis shows that independent-school competition has
an important negative impact on pupil wellbeing. In contrast, we note
that the association between the contemporary version of the instru-
ment and pupil happiness is positive. This supports the idea that our
strategy if anything may bias the estimates against ﬁnding evidence in
favour of our hypothesis.20
5.2. Robustness tests
In Table 2, we display results from several robustness tests.21
Column 1 only includes pupils in government-operated schools. Note
that these results reﬂect both competition eﬀects and the impact of
potential diﬀerential pupil sorting into the independent and state sec-
tors. It is plausible that state schools could be especially sensitive to
independent-school competition, since independent schools themselves
may to some extent always face competition from the government
sector. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect on pupils in state schools is in fact very
similar compared to the overall impact, suggesting that the main results
primarily reﬂect system-level eﬀects of independent-school competition
rather than the impact of attending an independent school per se.
Next, in Column 2, we exclude all non-European countries in the
equation, dropping ten countries and 36% of the total pupil sample. The
Table 2
Robustness tests.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Only pupils in state
schools




Independent-school share -1.37*** -1.27*** -1.30*** -1.24***
(0.38) (0.43) (0.32) (0.33)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 0.46*** 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.52***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.08) (0.10)
F statistic 48.62 42.27 42.5 45.23
n 150,231 121,050 182,146 190,348
Countries 34 24 32 34
Note: Signiﬁcance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. All regressions include the controls outlined in Sections 3.5 and
4.1, including within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. The exception is Column 4, which excludes pupil-background variables.
Table 1
The impact of independent-school competition on pupil happiness.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Second stage
Independent-school share -0.52** -0.69*** Independent-school share -0.79*** -1.28***
(0.24) (0.17) (0.22) (0.32)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 0.22** 0.36*** Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 0.33*** 0.49***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Reduced form (5) (6) First stage
OLS OLS
Catholic share 1900 *no state religion -0.24*** -0.29*** Catholic share 1900 *no state religion 0.31*** 0.23***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 0.15*** 0.21* Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 0.22*** 0.21***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.08)
Within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects NO YES NO YES
F statistic on the excluded instrument 46.33 45.87
N 190,348 190,348 190,348 190,348
Countries 34 34 34 34
Note: Signiﬁcance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. All regressions include the controls described in Sections 3.5 and
4.1.
20 As displayed in Table A2, we ﬁnd similar eﬀects on alternative measures of pupil
wellbeing, such as school satisfaction and peer relations.
21 In unreported robustness tests, we also included additional country-level controls,
including the Gini coeﬃcient, the share of population in urban areas, and the relative size
of the immigrant population. The results were very similar compared to the baseline
models.
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results are robust to this exercise, despite controlling for within-
European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. In Column 3, we instead exclude
Belgium and the Netherlands, which are perhaps the most canonical
examples of successful Catholic struggles for independent-school access,
to ensure these countries do not drive the results. The ﬁndings are es-
sentially identical when excluding these countries.22 We thus conclude
that the results are robust to excluding a considerable and important
part of the sample.23
Finally, in Column 4, we exclude all pupil-background controls and
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient is essentially identical to the baseline, although
it becomes slightly less precise. This is expected if some or all of the
excluded background characteristics both aﬀect the outcome variable,
which unreported estimates show is indeed the case, and are un-
correlated with our instrument (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Overall,
these results thus support the idea that the instrument is not sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with the pupil-background characteristics, once
controlling for the other variables.24
5.3. Balancing tests
As discussed in Section 4.5, to further explore the exogeneity of the
instrument, we analyse the pupil-background characteristics as depen-
dent variables instead of controls, while simultaneously excluding all
other pupil-level variables on the right-hand side of the equation. We do
not expect the variation in independent-school competition that is ex-
plained by our instrument to be signiﬁcantly related to these variables,
once other country-level factors are held constant, at least not in a di-
rection that would bias the estimates in favour of ﬁnding evidence of
our hypothesis.25 The results from the IV models in Table 3 display that
this is indeed the case. We are unable to predict any of the background
variables using the variation in independent-school enrolment shares
that is explained by our instrument. In other words, there is little evi-
dence that the instrument is signiﬁcantly correlated with potentially
important predictors of wellbeing in a direction that would bias the
estimates in favour of our hypothesis.26
Table 3
Balancing tests.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Index of home Parental occupational Parental Immigrant Immigrant
Gender Age possessions status education (1st gen) (2nd gen)
Independent-school share 0.02 0.06 0.01 -1.41 3.07 -0.07 -0.16
(0.04) (0.10) (0.49) (9.69) (2.36) (0.12) (0.11)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion -0.02 0.00 0.38*** 1.81 -0.95 -0.05 -0.05
(0.02) (0.03) (0.13) (2.15) (0.62) (0.05) (0.04)
F statistic 47.19 47.18 46.99 46.71 46.54 46.27 44.73
n 295,416 295,330 291,731 280,796 285,877 244,043 269,794
Countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
Note: Signiﬁcance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. All regressions include the controls described in Sections 3.5 and
4.1, including within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects, apart from pupil-level variables.
Table 4
The impact of independent-school competition on academic eﬃciency.
Mathematics Reading Science Educational
expenditures/pupil
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent-school share 46.86 56.70* 41.84 -37,214***
(33.30) (31.24) (32.82) (13,064)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 21.97 9.04 23.43 14,466
(20.71) (24.51) (17.01) (12,918)
IV (5) (6) (7) (8)
Independent-school share 209.57*** 262.10*** 177.03*** -131,546***
(51.62) (69.56) (50.14) (28,377)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion -12.13 -34.01 -4.90 34,235***
(20.59) (27.97) (18.94) (10,801)
n 295,416 295,416 295,416 295,416
Countries 34 34 34 34
Note: Signiﬁcance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. The regressions include the controls described in Sections 3.5
and 4.1, including within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. F statistics in Columns 5-8: 46.54.
22 When dropping Ireland, another example of successful Catholic resistance, the
coeﬃcient increased in size somewhat and remained signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while the
F statistics drops just under 20. Similarly, excluding Ireland together with Belgium or the
Netherlands – or excluding all three countries at the same time – generated similar results.
The same holds true when excluding the within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects and the F
statistic never fell under 25 in these instances.
23 In unreported regressions, we also dropped all countries one by one – and various
combinations of countries – and the estimates were always robust to this exercise.
24 We also tested the idea that our instrument isolates similar types of independent-
school competition across countries by adding relevant variables that may aﬀect the type
of competition. The results are reported in Table A3. All estimates are basically identical
compared to the relevant baseline models.
25 The validity of our results hinges on the instrument being exogenous once the
country-level variables are held constant, which we test by studying the pupil-background
characteristics as dependent variables. Nevertheless, in unreported robustness tests, we
also analysed the correlation between the instrument and relevant country-level vari-
ables, such as (log) GDP per capita, income inequality, the share of the population who
live in urban areas, and the relative size of the immigrant population, including and
excluding the contemporary version of the instrument and regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. The
results did not indicate consistently signiﬁcant correlations.
26 In contrast, we note that the contemporary version of the instrument is positively
correlated with the index of home possessions, which is the pupil-level variable that has
the strongest positive association with the wellbeing measures of all pupil-level controls
in the regressions in Tables 1 and 2.
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5.4. The trade-oﬀ with academic eﬃciency
Thus far, we have shown that independent-school competition has a
negative causal impact on pupil wellbeing. Since previous research
using a similar strategy ﬁnds positive eﬀects on pupil performance in
PISA and a negative impact on educational expenditures (West &
Woessmann, 2010), this is suﬃcient to provide general support for our
hypothesis of a wellbeing-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ. Still, since we analyse
data from PISA 2012 rather than from PISA 2003, and use a modiﬁed IV
set-up, we also explore the eﬀects of competition on PISA test scores
and per-pupil expenditure, using our preferred speciﬁcation for the
analysis of pupil-wellbeing.
The upper panel in Table 4 shows OLS estimates, which indicate
that independent-school competition does not have a statistically sig-
niﬁcant relationship with pupil performance, apart from being mar-
ginally correlated with reading literacy, but that it is negatively asso-
ciated with educational expenditures. However, turning to the
preferred IV estimates in the lower panel, the coeﬃcients increase in
size and become strongly signiﬁcant in all models: a 10 percentage-
point increase in independent-school enrolment shares raises mathe-
matical literacy by 21 PISA points (0.23 SD), reading literacy by 26
PISA points (0.28 SD), and scientiﬁc literacy by 18 PISA points (0.19
SD). Simultaneously, it lowers expenditures by $13,155 (0.48 SD).
These eﬀects are larger than those found by West and
Woessmann (2010), which is mainly due to our inclusion of within-
European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. Indeed, when excluding these dum-
mies, the eﬀects are very similar to their results.27 We also note that the
contemporary version of the instrument is positively associated with
expenditures, while its association with achievement is negative but not
statistically signiﬁcant.28 Overall, the results are in line with West and
Woessmann's (2010) ﬁndings and thus support our hypothesis that
school competition involves a causal wellbeing-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ.29
5.5. Potential mechanisms behind the trade-oﬀ
Finally, we turn to the potential mechanisms discussed in
Section 3.3. The results in Table 5 indicate that a 10 percentage-point
increase in independent-school enrolment shares induces less in-
dividualisation of teaching, corresponding to 0.16 points on the 1–4
ordinal scale (0.15 SD); less project work, corresponding to 0.09 points
(0.10 SD); and less group work, corresponding to 0.08 points (0.08 SD).
However, there is no impact on the extent to which teachers ask pupils
to help plan classroom activities. Also, a 10 percentage-point increase in
independent-school enrolment shares decreases perceptions that pupils
get along with teachers by 0.08 steps on the 1–4 ordinal scale (0.12 SD)
and perceptions that teachers listen to what pupils have to say by 0.07
steps (0.09 SD).30 Meanwhile, it raises parental achievement pressure
by 0.19 steps on the 1–3 ordinal scale (0.26 SD). This indicates that
competition makes teaching more traditional and pupil-teacher rela-
tions more hierarchical, while sharpening parents’ focus on
Table 5
The impact on potential mechanisms behind the trade-oﬀ.
Teaching practices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individualisation of teaching Project work Group work Pupils help to plan
Independent-school share -1.57*** -0.90** -0.81*** 1.10
(0.37) (0.43) (0.28) (1.04)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion -0.05 -0.17 0.07 -0.60
(0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.36)
n 191,806 191,799 191,865 191,832
Countries 34 34 34 34
Pupil-teacher relations, parental achievement pressure, and homework
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Pupils get along with teachers Teachers listen to pupils Parental achievement pressure Hours of homework
Independent-school share -0.84*** -0.68*** 1.86*** 8.18**
(0.17) (0.16) (0.46) (3.30)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion -0.02 -0.01 -0.47** 1.95
(0.08) (0.06) (0.23) (1.24)
n 187,146 191,320 282,606 187,146
Countries 34 34 34 34
Instructional time
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Class periods (total) Class periods (mathematics) Class periods (test language) Class periods (science)
Independent-school share 23.43*** 4.53*** 5.00** -2.83***
(6.75) (1.47) (1.94) (0.98)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 2.32 -1.12* -0.71 -1.31***
(2.09) (0.59) (0.73) (0.40)
n 162,430 184,354 183,030 179,223
Countries 34 34 34 34
Note: Signiﬁcance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. The regressions include the controls described in Sections 3.5
and 4.1, including within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. The F statistic ranges between 40.46 and 46.06 in all regressions.
27 They obtain point estimates of 58.99-121.69 and -45,736 for PISA scores and ex-
penditures respectively in their equivalent analyses (see Column 2 in their Tables 2 and 5
and Columns 2 and 5 in their Table 4), whereas we obtain 68.96–126.65 and -74,201
respectively when excluding within-European regional eﬀects. None of the diﬀerences are
statistically signiﬁcant.
28 Again, Table A4 shows that the results comfortably survive the other robustness tests
conducted in regard to pupil wellbeing in Table 2. Unreported regressions also showed
that the ﬁndings were robust to adding the additional variables in Table A3. In contrast,
the coeﬃcient of the contemporary instrument changes wildly depending on the speci-
ﬁcation and sample (see Tables A4 and A5). This further supports the idea that the his-
torical instrument is exogenous, while its contemporary version is not.
29 We also carried out a basic placebo test on per-capita military expenditures in 2011,
obtained from SIPRI (2016) and adjusted for diﬀerent price levels using 2011 GDP per
capita PPPs. Military expenditures are unlikely to be related to educational expenditures
and appear to be an appropriate placebo outcome. We found no evidence indicating that
the variation in independent-school competition that is explained by our instrument was
related to military expenditures.
30 In unreported regressions, we found very similar eﬀects on the overall index of
pupil-teacher relationships and headteachers’ perceptions of such relationships.
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achievement – which are clear mechanisms behind the wellbeing-eﬃ-
ciency trade-oﬀ.
We also ﬁnd that competition increases instructional time and
homework. An increase in independent-school enrolment shares by 10
percentage points increases the total number of class periods by 2.43
periods per week (0.30 SD), while inducing pupils to complete 0.82 h
(0.16 SD) more homework per week. However, there is heterogeneity
in terms of the eﬀects on the number of class periods in the subjects
tested in PISA. While the number of periods in mathematics and test
language increases by 0.45 periods (0.32 SD) and 0.50 periods (0.34
SD) per week respectively, the number of class periods decreases in
science by 0.28 periods (0.13 SD). This indicates that competition
increases instructional time in mathematics and test language, but
decreases it in science.31 This could suggest that competition increases
schools’ focus on core subjects to the detriment of other subjects. Still,
instruction in the test language and mathematics (and other subjects)
may improve performance also in science.32 Overall, we thus conclude
that competition has positive eﬀects on instructional time and home-
work, two plausible mechanisms behind the wellbeing-eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ.
5.6. A tentative cost-beneﬁt analysis
Ultimately, the study's ﬁndings demand the question: should pol-
icymakers increase independent-school competition and thus raise
academic eﬃciency or should they ignore such reforms and instead
prioritise pupil wellbeing? The answer depends on the relative long-
term societal and economic value of pupil wellbeing versus cognitive
achievement in adolescence. In this section, we thus provide a basic
back-of-the-envelope calculation to analyse whether the beneﬁts of
competition in terms of academic eﬃciency outweigh its costs in terms
of pupil wellbeing.
Recent research indicates that cognitive achievement in childhood
and adolescence is a much better predictor than wellbeing in childhood
and adolescence of adult income. According to Layard et al.'s (2014)
estimates, one standard deviation higher cognitive achievement in
childhood and adolescence predicts 0.14 SD higher income at the age of
34, while such an increase in youth wellbeing is associated with 0.07 SD
higher income at the same age. Our estimates indicate that a 10 per-
centage-point increase in independent-school competition raises
average test scores by 0.23 SD and decreases pupil wellbeing by 0.17
SD. One would thus expect a beneﬁt in terms of adult income by 0.03
SD via higher test scores and a cost of 0.01 SD via lower pupil well-
being. Since we also ﬁnd that independent-school competition de-
creases per-pupil cumulative education expenditures between ages
6–15, such competition thus appears to make sense from an economic
perspective.
At the same time, Layard et al. (2014) also ﬁnd that youth wellbeing
is considerably more important than cognitive achievement for adult
life satisfaction. A cost-beneﬁt analysis using adult subjective wellbeing
rather than money as unit of measurement would suggest that a 10
percentage-point increase in independent-school competition should
generate 0.01 SD higher life satisfaction via higher cognitive achieve-
ment – but this is outweighed by the cost of 0.03 SD via lower pupil
wellbeing.33 In other words, if we hold subjective wellbeing as the
primary goal of policy, the costs of independent-school competition
may outweigh its beneﬁts.
Certainly, given the tentative nature of the above cost-beneﬁt ana-
lysis, it is important to pursue further research before drawing strong
conclusions regarding the potential longer-term eﬀects of independent-
school competition on adult wellbeing and labour-market outcomes.34
Yet the analysis at least indicates that the attractiveness of school
competition as an education-reform strategy may depend on which
goals policymakers seek to advance, which is beyond this paper to
determine.
6. Conclusion
As governments worldwide have sought to inject competition from
independent providers into their countries’ education systems, an ex-
panding literature has begun to evaluate the eﬀects of such competi-
tion. Yet existing research focuses on academic outcomes and no one
has thus far analysed how independent-school competition aﬀects pupil
wellbeing, which has become an increasingly important policy goal
recently. Since eﬀective learning involves many activities that are not
necessarily fun or inspiring, and since market incentives are likely to
sharpen schools’ focus on academic achievement, it is plausible that
competition involves a trade-oﬀ between wellbeing and education
performance.
Analysing pupil-level PISA data across 34 OECD countries, this
paper has sought to investigate the existence of such a trade-oﬀ and
potential mechanisms behind it. It utilised an IV strategy based on
Catholic resistance to state schooling in the 19th and early 20th
centuries to predict enrolment shares in independently-operated
schools today, while simultaneously controlling for the con-
temporary version of the instrument itself and other important
variables that threaten its validity. We found that independent-
school competition has a sizeable negative impact on pupil well-
being, which survives a number of robustness tests. The paper further
conﬁrmed a positive eﬀect on PISA scores and a negative impact on
education spending found in previous research, thus providing clear
evidence of a trade-oﬀ.
We also showed that balancing tests on pupil-background variables
support the causal interpretation of our ﬁndings. In fact, if anything,
there are more indications that our strategy may bias estimates against
ﬁnding evidence in favour of our hypothesis. Nevertheless, future re-
search should investigate whether or not alternative data and identiﬁ-
cation strategies generate similar results.
Analysing relevant mechanisms behind the wellbeing-eﬃciency
trade-oﬀ, we found that independent-school competition makes
teaching more traditional and pupil-teacher relationships more hier-
archical, while also increasing parental achievement pressure. In ad-
dition, we found positive eﬀects on instructional time and time spent on
homework. These are all features that previous research suggests gen-
erate higher achievement and lower wellbeing. Future research should
investigate other mechanisms linking competition to lower wellbeing
and higher academic eﬃciency – and to what extent similar trade-oﬀs
apply to other education-reform strategies.
A tentative back-of-the-envelope calculation indicated that the
economic beneﬁts of independent-school competition via its positive
impact on cognitive achievement appear to outweigh its cost via lower
pupil wellbeing. At the same time, the calculation also indicates that the
costs of competition may outweigh its beneﬁts when using adult life
satisfaction as the unit of measurement. While more research into this
31 In unreported regressions, we found no eﬀects on average minutes per period in any
of the test subjects, supporting the idea that our estimates capture the impact of com-
petition on total learning time.
32 However, note that the point estimate in Table 4 is smaller when analysing science
scores. The negative impact we ﬁnd on instructional time in science may thus lower the
positive eﬀects of competition.
33 Note that the calculation is based on the direct correlation between youth well-
being/cognitive achievement and adult life satisfaction, which means that any eﬀects that
operate via higher income in adulthood are incorporated in the calculation automatically.
Similarly, the calculation regarding the impact of independent-school competition on
adult income incorporates the latter's eﬀect on life satisfaction automatically.
34 For example, the cost-beneﬁt analysis treats wellbeing in school as equal to the more
general child wellbeing metrics employed by Layard et al. (2014). Further research is
necessary to establish to what extent this matters for the results.
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issue is necessary, justifying the higher direct and indirect costs of a
non-competitive education system may hinge on upholding subjective
wellbeing as a primary goal for public policy. While we refrain from
drawing strong conclusions in this respect, our results highlight the
potential for a more general trade-oﬀ between the traditional goals of
education policy and the wellbeing agenda to which policymakers
should pay attention – regardless of what goals they ultimately choose
to pursue.
Appendix A. Additional tables
Table A2
Alternative measures of pupil wellbeing.
General pupil wellbeing
Pupil Satisfaction Things are ideal Belong at Overall wellbeing
happiness with school at school school index
Independent-school share -1.28*** -1.31*** -1.93*** -1.69*** -2.22***
(0.32) (0.22) (0.52) (0.48) (0.60)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 0.49*** 0.40*** -0.07 0.30 0.55**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.25) (0.19) (0.24)
F statistic 45.87 45.88 45.92 45.83 45.97
n 190,348 190,616 190,585 190,639 191,913
Countries 34 34 34 34 34
Peer relations/speciﬁc reasons for general pupil wellbeing
Outsider at Make friends Feel awkward Liked by Lonely at
school easily at school at school other pupils school
Independent-school share 0.81*** -0.69*** 0.36 -0.76*** 0.53**
(0.28) (0.18) (0.29) (0.24) (0.24)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion -0.40*** 0.23*** -0.23** 0.12 -0.22***
(0.11) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
F statistic 45.64 45.94 45.92 45.77 45.95
n 191,058 191,282 190,762 190,521 190,905
Countries 34 34 34 34 34
Note: Signiﬁcance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. All regressions include the controls described in Sections 3.5 and
4.1, including within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. Items analysed: (1) ‘I am happy at school’; (2) ‘I am satisﬁed with my school’; (3) ‘Things are ideal in my school’; (4) ‘I feel like I
belong at school’; and (5) the overall wellbeing index. The overall wellbeing index is constructed from responses to all statements in Columns 1-4 as well as those in Columns 6-10, which
tap into speciﬁc reasons behind the level of wellbeing, such as peer relations: ‘I feel like an outsider (or left out of things) at school’; ‘I make friends easily at school’; ‘Other students seem
to like me’; ‘I feel awkward and out of place in my school’; and ‘I feel lonely at school’.
Table A1
Descriptive statistics.
Mean SD Mean SD
Wellbeing and academic eﬃciency
Happiness at school 3.00 0.76 PISA science 501.14 93.78
PISA mathematics 494.03 93.93 Educational expenditure/pupil 69,130 28,217
PISA reading 496.45 93.91
Country- and regional-level variables Pupil-background variables
Independent-school share 0.19 0.21 Girl 0.50 0.50
Catholic share 1900 (no state religion) 0.29 0.36 Age 15.77 0.29
Catholic share 2010 (no state religion) 0.27 0.30 Index of home possessions 0.00 1.00
(log) GDP/capita 2011 10.43 0.35 Parental occupational status 50.66 21.61
Population 1900 13,800,000 18,200,000 Parental education 13.49 3.04
Calvinist share 1900 0.06 0.13 Immigrant (1st generation) 0.05 0.21
Early Catholic defeat (soft) 0.08 0.27 Immigrant (2nd generation) 0.15 0.36
Early Catholic defeat (hard) 0.06 0.24
Nazi annexation 0.18 0.38 Pupil-level variables (institutional characteristics)
Pro-Catholic Nazi ally 0.10 0.29 Grade 9.62 0.73
Jesuit ban 0.16 0.36 School starting age 6.10 0.85
Communist 0.18 0.38
Post-Soviet 0.03 0.17 School location
For-proﬁt voucher/mass conversion 0.08 0.28 Village 0.09 0.29
Small town 0.21 0.41
Town 0.35 0.48
City 0.24 0.43
Large city 0.11 0.31
Mechanisms
Individualisation of teaching 1.94 1.06 Achievement pressure (headteacher) 1.88 0.73
Project work 1.65 0.89 Class periods (total) 31.03 7.82
Group work 1.84 0.96 Class periods (language) 4.13 1.48
Help planning 1.66 0.88 Class periods (mathematics) 4.16 1.40
Get along with teachers 3.01 0.67 Class periods (science) 3.76 2.13
Teachers listen to pupils 2.89 0.74 Hours of homework 4.89 4.69
Note: The descriptive statistics display each variable's international mean and standard deviation (weighted by sampling probabilities with all countries given equal weight) without any
imputed values.
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Table A4
Robustness tests for academic eﬃciency.
Mathematics Reading Science Educational expenditures/pupil
Only state schools
Independent-school share 214.24*** 255.56*** 162.70** -130,083***
(67.01) (85.30) (63.43) (28,477)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion -14.70 -39.18 -6.35 35,867***
(25.13) (32.71) (22.56) (9,998)
F statistic 49.73 49.73 49.73 49.73
n 233,309 233,309 233,309 233,309
Countries 34 34 34 34
Only Europe
Independent-school share 249.64*** 285.28*** 184.02*** -141,424***
(49.06) (57.99) (48.29) (27,638)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion -48.42** -74.75*** -28.99 53,427***
(22.24) (24.12) (20.45) (10,285)
F statistic 42.52 42.52 42.52 42.52
n 188,173 188,173 188,173 188,173
Countries 24 24 24 24
Belgium and the Netherlands excluded
Independent-school share 252.03*** 329.56*** 230.67*** -157,986***
(79.18) (92.01) (63.02) (29,633)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion -3.44 -25.64 1.66 32,225***
(26.81) (34.08) (22.72) (11,545)
F statistic 42.87 42.87 42.87 42.87
n 282,359 282,359 282,359 282,359
Countries 32 32 32 32
Excluding pupil-background characteristics
Independent-school share 260.22*** 321.27*** 233.39*** -132,297***
(58.22) (76.71) (53.85) (28,644)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion -9.69 -33.75 -2.88 34,861***
(22.42) (31.19) (20.72) (10,927)
F statistic 45.88 45.88 45.88 45.88
n 295,416 295,416 295,416 295,416
Countries 34 34 34 34
Reduced form
Catholic share 1900 *no state religion 47.77*** 59.74*** 40.35*** -29,984***
(10.24) (14.45) (10.61) (3,929)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 33.08** 22.52 33.29** 5,862
(16.39) (18.49) (15.51) (4,545)
n 295,416 295,416 295,416 295,416
Countries 34 34 34 34
Note: Signiﬁcance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. All regressions include pupil-, school-, and country-level
controls described in Sections 3.5 and 4.1, including within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table A3
Further robustness tests for pupil happiness.
Enrolment share of Share of state funding Average level of Exit
Control added for: privately-funded independent schools in independent schools independent-school autonomy exams
Independent-school share -1.29*** -1.02*** -1.20*** -1.25***
(0.36) (0.32) (0.28) (0.35)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 0.50*** 0.40*** 0.31*** 0.47***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
Added control -0.31 0.04 -0.18** -0.03
(1.57) (0.22) (0.09) (0.08)
F statistic 33.09 39.10 23.27 25.63
n 190,348 184,292 187,217 190,348
Countries 34 32 33 34
Note: Signiﬁcance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. All regressions include the controls described in Sections 3.5 and
4.1, including within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. Data on centralised exit examinations are obtained from Bol and Van de Werfhorst (2013). This source lacks data on Chile and
Mexico, which we obtain from Brandt (2010) and the OECD (2009) respectively. The other variables are obtained from OECD (2016a).
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Appendix B. Ensuring relevance and validity of the instrument
In order to maximise the relevance and validity of the instrument, it is important to control for other historical factors, which have determined
the extent to which Catholic resistance in the late 19th and early 20th centuries generated higher independent-school competition – and, if it did, the
extent to which this competition has survived to this day. This problem is generally ignored in previous research, with the sole exception being the
most obvious example: the rise of Communist regimes from the October Revolution in 1917 onwards, which undid most progress made by Catholics
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. We take this into account by controlling for countries’ Communist background, obtained from Barro and
McCleary (2005), and post-Soviet background.35 The former applies Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slo-
venia, whereas the latter applies to Estonia only.36
But there are more nuanced historical issues, which are important to consider for the purpose of generating a relevant and valid instrument for
independent-school competition based on the basic intuition described in Section 4.1. To begin with, we control for the share of Calvinists (reformed
Protestants) in 1900, obtained from Brown and James (2015). This is to account for the fact that Calvinists in some countries, such as the Neth-
erlands, joined the Catholics’ more general resistance to secular state schooling (Glenn, 1989, 2011). In those countries, with such reinforcements,
Catholics could obtain successes in the educational sphere that were disproportionate to the relative size of their own community.
We also control for population size in 1900, obtained from Brown and James (2015), to account for the fact that Catholics in larger countries
often faced more formidable coordination problems and higher transaction costs to mobilise successfully (e.g. Wilkinson et al., 2006). Further
building on this intuition, we note that the success of Catholics in defending their interests in countries with strong anticlerical currents depended on
their actual success of early political mobilisation (see Kaiser and Wohnout, 2004). In countries where Catholics failed to eﬀectively mobilise
politically against anti-clerical forces early on, and thus faced defeat, state monopolisation of schooling was more successful than in countries where
Catholics mobilised more eﬀectively at an early stage.
For example, whereas Belgian and Dutch Catholics were able to successfully lobby for access to and public funding for independent schools in the
latter part of the 19th century – and German and Swiss Catholics ensured access to mostly public, but also independent, religious schools following
decades of setbacks – due to the success of Catholic political mobilisation (e.g. Evans, 1999; Glenn, 1989, 2011; Kaiser and Wohnout. 2004), French
Catholics struggled to develop a coherent political strategy and were consequently less successful in this endeavour. Indeed, as the concept of laïcité
came to dominate education policy in France in the latter part of the 19th century, French Catholics suﬀered consecutive defeats due to their inability
to mount a successful political defence (Boyer, 2004). Consecutive decrees in the 1880s decreased the role of the Church in state schooling con-
siderably, and the 1904 law pushed through by Prime Minister Émile Combes sought to end it entirely in both the public and independent sectors.
Many publicly-funded schools that had been maintained by congregations were thus reopened as fee-based schools that hired lay teachers but still
maintained a ‘Catholic character’. Overall, however, the 1904 law led to a considerable decrease in de facto independently-operated school en-
rolment shares. In 1902, 21.6% of boys and 42% of girls attended such schools; in 1912, these ﬁgures had declined to 12.8% and 24.8% respectively,
not far from the situation at the end of the 20th century (Judge, 2001). Furthermore, the abrogation of Napoleon's concordat with the Vatican in
1905, which ﬁnally marked the de jure separation of church and state in France, meant that a system of public funding for independent schools
similar to those in Belgium and the Netherlands was never developed in the Third Republic (Teese, 1986). Consequently, despite the fact that France
had similar Catholic population shares as Belgium in the late 19th century, and considerably higher shares than the Netherlands, the inability of
French Catholics to successfully mobilise politically at an early stage of state centralisation appears to be an important reason why independent-
school competition never reached similar levels in France.
A similar, but more radical, story applies to Mexico, where Catholic political mobilisation only really took shape following the Mexican
Revolution in 1910. However, this ended abruptly after the ouster of pro-Catholic Victoriano Huerta in 1914. In the 1917 constitution, religious
institutions were banned from running independent schools, and the strict enforcement of this ban in the latter part of the 1920s – when Catholic
schools were forcibly closed – was an important contributory factor to the Cristero War (see Curley, 2008; Hamnet. 2006; Schell, 2003). In 1929, the
Church ﬁnally caved on the issue of religious education in schools and agreed to carry it out in churches only (Fernández, 2007). The ban on religious
independent schools was not revoked until 1992, although its enforcement varied over the decades, and there is still essentially no public funding
available (Blancarte, 1993; OECD, 2016). The early Catholic defeat and the inability to successfully mount a political defence later on thus had
similar, albeit more severe, consequences for independent schooling in Mexico as in France. We thus control for an indicator of these signiﬁcant early
Table A5
Including the school average of all pupil-level variables.
Pupil happiness Mathematics Reading Science Educational expenditures/pupil
Independent-school share -1.26*** 127.33*** 187.35*** 104.97*** -118,247***
(0.32) (37.23) (54.44) (38.92) (24,941)
Catholic share 2010 *no state religion 0.43*** -14.75 -36.32* -9.29 31,192***
(0.10) (14.71) (21.80) (13.72) (9,143)
F statistic 46.04 45.96 45.96 45.96 45.96
n 190,348 295,416 295,416 295,416 295,416
Countries 34 34 34 34 34
Note: Signiﬁcance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. All regressions include indicators for the school- and country-
level variables described in Sections 3.5 and 4.1, including within-European regional-ﬁxed eﬀects. They also include the school-level shares of girls, ﬁrst-generation immigrants, and
second-generation immigrants, age, parental education, parental occupational status, the index of home possessions, grade attended, and school starting age.
35 The post-Soviet indicator is included to account for the fact that Soviet annexation throughout the latter part of the 20th century ensured an especially extreme form of centralisation
and makeover of the education system, while also ensuring mass migration and a new parallel education system along linguistic lines (e.g. Krull and Trasberg, 2006; Stevick, 2006).
Today, this may aﬀect both demand and supply for independent schooling as well as pupil outcomes in ways that do not apply to post-Communist countries more generally.
36 Whenever an indicator only aﬀected parts of a country, we assign the share of the population aﬀected. This strategy follows Barro and McClearly (2005) who assign a value of 0.204
for Germany in terms of its Communist background, representing the East German population share. The only exception is when the PISA data allow us to identify the relevant within-
country regions, such as England in the UK, in which case we assign a value of 1 for all pupils in the region for which the indicator applies and 0 for the rest.
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Catholic political defeats in France and Mexico in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which appear important for today's levels of independent-
school competition.
In other countries, early Catholic pressure for access to independent schools suﬀered less draconian defeats. Instead, laws were passed to ensure
that independent confessional schools would simply not be eligible for public funding, precisely to decrease the alternative schooling opportunities
for Catholics. For example, anti-Catholic sentiments in the US during the 1800s led to increased political pressure to legislate against public funding
for parochial schools, while still maintaining essentially Protestant state schools. Thus, from the mid-1800s onwards, most US states began passing
amendments to their constitutions, or joined the Union with such amendments, which banned government funding for independent religious schools.
In the end, 41 states and the District of Columbia incorporated such measures in their constitutions at some point in time (Duncan, 2003; Katz, 2011),
covering 86% of the relevant population in the US. Similar developments occurred throughout Australia and New Zealand, albeit these changes were
not constitutionally enshrined (Buckley et al., 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2006). Thus, we control for indicators for areas that experienced these less
radical early Catholic defeats in the political realm separately.37
Similarly, we also control for indicators of 19th century national bans on the Society of Jesus and its associate orders, as long as they remained in
the early 20th century.38 The Society of Jesus was the ﬁrst teaching order of the Catholic Church and has been especially devoted to education from
its inception, having founded hundreds of independent schools worldwide, while also inspiring other orders in this direction (Duminuco, 2000).
During the struggle between secular and religious forces in the 19th century, several countries banned Jesuits and their associate orders from their
territories for longer periods of time, often speciﬁcally because of their educational inﬂuence (e.g. Chadwick, 1998; Healy, 2003). Due to the
importance of the Jesuits and their associate orders in opening and maintaining independent schools, we control for these bans in our set-up to
ensure maximum instrument relevance.
Furthermore, we take into account the unique impact of World War II on the independent-education systems in many countries. First, we control
for indicators of Nazi takeover and de facto annexation of regions into the Greater German Reich. Nazi ideologues strongly emphasised the im-
portance of education in socialising young people into their worldview, thus opposing independent or denominational schools and, indeed, any
religious elements in education whatsoever. Inevitably, this led to a radical persecution of the Catholic Church in Germany as well as all territories
that were either de jure or de facto annexed into the Reich. Indeed, in these areas, the Nazis closed down all denominational schools, public and
independent (see Mariaux, 1940; Pine, 2010). For example, just months after the Anschluss, all independent schools in Austria were closed and taken
over by the Nazi Party. Reichskommissar Josef Bürckel explained: ‘We must take care of the preservation of our nation in this world. This only is
possible if care is total care, therefore the school must belong to the state, upon which devolves the responsibility for the future’ (Chicago Daily
Tribune, 1938, p. 1). Similarly, following the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, the Vatican complained: ‘There are no longer any Catholic private
schools in Alsace. All Catholic educational institutions run by members of the Holy Order, priests or laymen, have been dissolved’ (The Tablet, 1941,
p. 290). Similar fates aﬄicted other de facto annexed regions, including Eupen–Malmedy in Belgium, Luxembourg, Czech lands, most of Slovenia,
and the whole of Poland, including the quasi-colony in the eastern parts that became known as the General Government (see Lapomarda, 2005;
NCWC, 1942; OUSSCCPAC, 1946).39
However, the same story does not apply to areas that were solely under military or civil administrative control. For example, in Belgium and the
Netherlands, ‘the churches were given a degree of leeway that allowed them to maintain their inﬂuence and preserve confessional institutions’ (Bank
and Gevers, 2016, p. 182). While the Nazis threatened to close Catholic schools in the Netherlands, due to anti-Nazi activities of the episcopacy, they
refrained from doing so, leaving most schools operating normally during the occupation (Warmbrunn, 1963). The fates of independently-operated
schools in Belgium and the Netherlands nicely display the diﬀerences in regions and countries that were merely occupied by, compared with regions
and countries that were de facto annexed into, the Greater German Reich.
At the same time, in pro-Catholic fascist and quasi-fascist countries allied to Nazi Germany, or acting as client states to Nazi Germany, the reverse
situation occurred during and right before World War II: the Catholic Church again reached privileged status in public life, which meant that
pressure for independent schools decreased for quite some time in countries that turned away from fascist and quasi-fascist ideology following World
War II. The canonical example here is the clericofascist Slovak Republic, led by the Catholic priest Josef Tiso, who restored Church privileges in the
public education system between 1938 and 1945 (Conway, 1974; Ward, 2013). Similar stories apply to Vichy France, Hungary, and Italy following
the Lateran Treaty of 1929 (see Fazekas, 2004; Sweets, 1994; Wolﬀ, 1980).40 Thus, whereas territories annexed into Nazi Germany experienced
Catholic persecution, pro-Catholic regimes allied with the country rather defused such pressure for independent schools for quite some time. This
often had implications for Catholic inﬂuence in education also after the war (e.g. Wolﬀ, 1992). We thus also include an indicator for pro-Catholic
Nazi client states or allies, before and during World War II, which abandoned fascist and quasi-fascist ideology after the war.
Finally, we also include indicators for countries or regions that in the latter part of the 20th century implemented voucher programmes in which
for-proﬁt operators participate on an equal basis, or very recent reforms that enabled mass conversions of state schools to independently-operated
status essentially overnight. There are two countries that allow for-proﬁt operators on an equal basis – Chile and Sweden – and only one nation in one
country that has allowed mass conversions of publicly-operated schools to independently-operated status: England. As a direct result of the 2010
Academies Act, which allowed essentially all English schools to become autonomous ‘academies’, the share of 15-year old pupils attending in-
dependently-operated schools in the United Kingdom increased from 6.31% in 2009 to 45.16% in 2012 (OECD, 2016a). Neither the enrolment
growth in for-proﬁt independently-operated schools nor such mass conversions has much to do with the independent-school competition that we aim
to capture with the instrument based on historical Catholic resistance to state schooling in the 19th century.
37 That is, Australia, New Zealand, and the relevant part of the US. Note, however, that results are very similar if we merely include one indicator for all countries where Catholics
suﬀered early political defeats.
38 More speciﬁcally, this applies to regions that belonged to the German Empire, France, Mexico, Norway, and Switzerland.
39 A small part of north-eastern Slovenia, covering about 6% of today's population, was never de facto annexed by Nazi Germany, but was instead part of Hungary, a country we code as
being pro Catholic. Nevertheless, the Hungarians were hardly pro Catholic in this annexed region: they closed all Slovenian schools, imprisoned Slovenian Catholic leaders, and made
Protestants the new elite, since the latter were perceived to be more amenable to forced Magyarisation (Kranjc, 2013). We thus do not code this small part of Slovenia as being pro
Catholic, although results are unsurprisingly almost identical if we do.
40 The Vichy regime did authorise communes to support independent schools ﬁnancially, but this happened only rarely and, when it did, the subsidies were very small. Consequently,
there was no increase in independent-school enrolment in France during the Vichy regime's tenure (Sweets, 1994).
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